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THE DELIBERATE CONSTRUCTION OF
FAMILIES WITHOUT FATHERS: IS IT AN
OPTION FOR LESBIAN AND HETEROSEXUAL
MOTHERS?
Nancy D. Polikoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
I start this paper with the premise that it is no tragedy,
either on a national scale or in an individual family, for chil-
dren to be raised without fathers. Children raised without
love and guidance, without shelter, nutrition, and health
care, without meaningful education, without physical safety
in their homes and on their streets - that is tragic. While
current discourse, exemplified in the public pronouncements
about welfare reform1 and in the recent book Fatherless
America,2 blames virtually all social ills on father absence, I
find such rhetoric both misdirected and terrifying. It is mis-
directed because it fails to focus on the needs of children I
have identified above, and it is terrifying because it furthers
social control of women by degrading the families that women
form without men.
Castigating women for raising children without fathers
and outside of marriage is nothing new. In response to the
resurgence of the feminist movement in the early 1970's,
George Gilder, then considered an ideological eccentric, de-
veloped the theory that men's aggressive, destructive tenden-
cies could be controlled only by a social order in which men
are motivated to be productive by the necessity of providing
* Professor, The American University Washington College of Law. I
would like to acknowledge the able research assistance of Lisa Levine, Alys
Summerton, and Joan Fina.
1. See, e.g., Joanne Jacobs, Good Parents Turn Out Good Kids, ATLANTA
CONsTrruTIoN, Mar. 22, 1995, at A12.
2. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA (1995).
3. For an excellent analysis of the woman-hating dimensions of the attack
on single mothers, see Nancy Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Mothers, 18 HARv. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 19 (1995).
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economic security for their wives and children.4 According to
Gilder's theory, all policies that make it possible for women to
live and raise children independently of men - including
welfare, affirmative action programs for women, and eco-
nomic justice upon divorce - thereby directly contribute to
the decline of a peaceful social order. Gilder went on to be a
Reagan guru; his theories, if articulated somewhat differ-
ently, are now mainstream.
An extreme outgrowth of Gilder's early theories was the
position that it should be difficult for women to obtain cus-
tody of minor children upon divorce. Stated most bluntly by
Daniel Amneus in his book, presciently titled Back to Patri-
archy, this position is: fathers should get custody of their
children, all alimony and child support should be eliminated,
and women who want to compete in the work world should do
so unencumbered by children and should leave those children
to fathers who will remarry women who want to stay home
and take proper care of them.5 It is a sobering indication of
the current political climate that Amneus, whose first book is
long out of print, is writing a new book, The Case for Father
Custody in Divorce.6
Contrary to the ideology that simultaneously glorifies fa-
thers and vilifies mothers, I want women to have the option
to form families in which their children have no fathers. This
is a hard position to develop without acknowledging a larger
social context of male indifference to the consequences of sex-
ual intercourse and male irresponsibility for the economic
well-being of the children they sire. What I envision as a
method of liberating women and children from the control of
men and of recognizing the legitimacy of deliberate childrear-
ing without fathers, men might see as a method of solidifying
sexual access to women with impunity and of eliminating un-
wanted financial obligations for children. What one woman
considers freedom to create the family structure she wishes,
another may view as coercion into an arrangement that
leaves her with no buffer against either relative or absolute
poverty.
4. GEORGE GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 85-88 (1973).
5. DANIEL AMNEUS, BACK TO PATRIARCHY 18-19.
6. Telephone Interview with Maureen Downey, Reporter, Atlanta Consti-
tution (June 5, 1995).
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As long as responsibility for the economic necessities of
childrearing rests upon individual biological parents rather
than the larger society, this tension will exist. Until health
care, child care, decent housing, nutrition, and education are
entitlements, as they are in the social democracies of Western
Europe,7 many women will be driven by economic imperative
to rely on their children's fathers for support. Any avenue
that eliminates a man's obligation to support his biological
children must be scrutinized to ensure that the mother's
choice to forego such support is made as freely as possible.
The choice to raise a child without a father is a legitimate
choice and the family thereby created is a legitimate family.
Planned lesbian families" exemplify the construction of
parenthood as a process distinct from biology, and the initial
impetus for the analysis developed in this paper was my de-
sire to develop a framework within which to safeguard
planned lesbian families. But I do not want to limit the avail-
ability of raising children without fathers to lesbians.
Rather, I like to think of lesbian and heterosexual women as
sisters in a struggle against the relentless propaganda of wo-
men-hating associated with the glorification of fathers.
Limiting the arguments in this paper to lesbian families
would be unwise for another reason. Analyses specific to les-
bians bearing children almost always focuses on conception
through alternative insemination, as though this was the
only method used by lesbians to get pregnant. Although
carving out space for forming families without fathers when
children are conceived through donor insemination is tempt-
ing, and might obviate the concerns about male avoidance of
responsibility for sexual activity that I discussed above, I am
not willing to so limit myself. The option of raising a child
without a father should be available to all women, and even
lesbians cannot be fully protected by focusing solely on donor
insemination. Anecdotal experience, requests made of les-
bian legal organizations, and some reported cases all confirm
7. See, e.g., RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST 180-88 (1986)
(describing family support policies in Sweden).
8. This term was first coined by psychologist April Martin. April Martin,
Lesbian Parenting: A Personal Odyssey, in GENDER IN TRANSITION 249 (J. Offer-
man-Zuckerberg ed., 1989). A planned lesbian family is one in which a lesbian
deliberately chooses to raise a child without being married or heterosexually
involved. Id. One anthropologist, describing the same phenomenon, uses the
term "intentional motherhood." ELLEN LEWIN, LESBIAN MOTHERS 47-48 (1993).
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that sometimes lesbians conceive children through sexual in-
tercourse. 9 The willingness of the biological parents, not the
method of conception, should be the cornerstone of any ana-
lytical framework.
The analysis in this paper assumes that: (1) at least at
some point, the biological father agrees that he will have no
legal rights and responsibilities towards his child; and (2) the
biological mother wants to raise her children without a legal
father. In this paper, I examine two recent cases where there
were such agreements but the biological father later changed
his mind. After considering the two very different ap-
proaches and outcomes of these cases, I look at the possibility
of obtaining a judicial termination of parental rights while
the father is in agreement, thereby eliminating the possibil-
ity of a later change of heart.
II. COURT REACTION TO PRIVATE ORDERING
A. Thomas S. v. Robin Y.
Thomas S. v. Robin Y 0 began sixteen years ago when
Robin Young and Sandra Russo decided to expand their fam-
ily to include children.1 They lived in New York, but they
had friends in California and they knew that it was becoming
increasingly common for lesbians in California to bear chil-
dren - usually conceived through alternative insemination
- and to raise them in an openly lesbian family structure.
This phenomenon of planned lesbian families was not yet
common in New York, or anywhere on the east coast.
Robin and Sandra decided that Sandra, who was older,
would bear a child first. They found a gay man, Jack Kolb,
who lived in California and who agreed to donate his semen.
He also agreed that Robin and Sandra would raise the child
as coparents, that he would have no parental rights or obliga-
tions, and that he would make himself known to the child at a
9. See, e.g., In re Hatzopoulos, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (Dec. 6, 1977).
The staff of the National Center for Lesbian Rights reports receiving telephone
calls concerning the legal status of children born to lesbians after conception
through sexual intercourse.
10. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
11. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 377 (Faro. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994). See also Trial Record Transcript, Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fain. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div.
1994) (on file with author).
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future time selected by the mothers. Cade Russo-Young was
born on May 18, 1980.
Shortly thereafter, the couple decided that Robin would
bear a child. They selected a different sperm donor, Thomas
Steel, who also lived in California and who agreed to the
same conditions that the mothers had established with their
first donor. Ry Russo-Young was born on November 16, 1981.
In early 1985, Cade, almost five years old, began asking
about her biological origins. The mothers contacted both
Jack Kolb and Tom Steel and traveled to San Francisco so
that both children could meet the "men who helped make
them."
The contact with Tom was happy and led to a continuing
relationship. There were several visits between Tom and the
family over the next six years. These visits took place at the
family's home in New York, at vacation homes and in San
Francisco. However, Tom decided he wanted to reinstate his
parental rights. The twenty-six day trial that took place over
several months in 1992 included substantial evidence, much
of it contested, about the nature of these visits and the rela-
tionships that developed. Tom portrayed himself as having
an independent, father-daughter relationship with Ry. The
mothers portrayed the relationship as one between Tom and
the entire family in which Tom was no more important to Ry
than were other close family friends.
Tom's most significant evidence included: instances Ry
had referred to him as "Dad," verbally and in correspondence,
including in a Father's Day card, descriptions of times he
spent with Ry in which Ry was obviously happy to see him,
and gifts he had sent Ry, including money he had sent to the
family which he characterized as a form of support. The
mothers' most significant evidence established that: Tom had
never spent a night with Ry in which the mothers were not
also present; that the number of days he claimed to spend
with Ry were misleading both because the time was spent
with the family, not just Ry, and because either Tom was at
work or Ry was in school during many of the days included in
Tom's calculations; that Tom had never made decisions con-
cerning Ry's life or provided any daily care or financial sup-
port for her; that Ry had sent an identical Father's Day card
to Jack Kolb; and that whatever relationship Tom had with
the children, he had with Ry and Cade together.
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In late 1990, Tom decided that he wanted to introduce Ry
to his parents and his grandmother, who up until that time
had not known of her existence. He was not comfortable in-
cluding the mothers in these introductions. He asked the
mothers to send both girls to California the following sum-
mer. When the mothers refused, he filed a paternity action in
New York Family Court in August, 1991, seeking an order of
paternity for Ry and two weeks of immediate visitation in
California. The immediate visitation order was denied. Once
Tom commenced the litigation, Robin and Sandra ceased all
social contact between Tom and their family.
At the paternity trial, in addition to the evidence con-
cerning the history of the relationships among the parties,
the court heard the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Myles
Schneider, who, with the consent of all parties, had conducted
a lengthy evaluation of all the relevant individuals. Dr.
Schneider recommended against an order of paternity and
against court-ordered visitation. The trial court's decision
characterized Dr. Schneider's testimony as follows:
Ry, Dr. Schneider said, considers Sandra R. and
Robin Y. to be her parents and Cade to be her full sister.
She understands the underlying- biological relationships,
but they are not the reality of her life. The reality of her
life is having two mothers, Robin Y. and Sandra R., work-
ing together to raise her and her sister. Ry does not now
and has never viewed Thomas S. as a functional third par-
ent. To Ry, a parent is a person who a child depends on to
care for her needs. To Ry, Thomas S. has never been a
parent since he never took care of her on a daily basis.
Ry, Dr. Schneider said, views Robin Y. and Sandra R.
as having a relationship with each other that should be
given respect. She knows that she, Cade and her mothers
comprise an unusual and unconventional family. She
knows that some outside her family have often shown in-
tolerance and insensitivity toward her family. Notwith-
standing this intolerance, Ry's own view of her family is
that of a warm, loving, supportive environment.
Ry, he said, views this court proceeding as an attack
on and threat to her positive image of herself and her fam-
ily. Her sense of family security is threatened. [For Ry, a
declaration of paternity would be a statement that she,
Young, and Steel constitute one family unit and Cade,
Russo, and Kolb form another. This juxtaposition of rela-
tionships frightens her]....
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Ry does not want to visit Thomas S. [for various rea-
sons, Dr. Schneider believes. She is angry at him for un-
dermining the security she felt in her concept of family.
She feels betrayed because she and her family had
counted on him as a supporter of their unconventional
family unit. She feels he is acting out of a selfish desire to
get what he wants, without appreciating how hurtful his
actions have been to her and her family.]' 2
Dr. Schneider did not believe that Ry was "brainwashed"
into expressing her views. Of course, he recognized, as I do,
that her views were shaped by the views of Robin and San-
dra.13 The trial court had appointed a law guardian to repre-
sent Ry who also argued against a finding of paternity.
The trial court denied Tom's petition. It applied the prin-
ciples of equitable estoppel which numerous New York courts
had used in cases involving paternity. The court found that
Tom had agreed that he would not have parental rights and
that, had he not done so, he would not have been chosen as
the donor. The court found that Tom's conduct over the sub-
sequent decade "confirmed his earliest representations."14
This conduct included his failure to provide financial support,
failure to file for paternity early in Ry's life, lack of effort to
see Ry for the first three years of her life, his subsequent will-
ingness to allow his contacts with Ry to be at Robin's com-
plete discretion, and his knowledge of Ry's parental bond
with Sandra and sibling bond with Cade and his support of
that functional family for many years. The court also found
that Tom decided to change the ground rules of Ry's life due
to changes in his own life. 15
The court concluded that an order of paternity would not
be in Ry's best interests, finding:
This attempt [to change the ground rules of Ry's life]
has already caused Ry anxiety, nightmares, and psycho-
logical harm. Ry views this proceeding as a threat to her
sense of family security. For her, a declaration of pater-
nity would be a statement that her family is other than
what she knows it to be and needs it to be.
12. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (Faro. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994) (alterations appear in slip opinion at 10-12).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 382.
15. Id.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
To Ry, Thomas S. is an outsider attacking her family,
refusing to give it respect, and seeking to force her to
spend time with him and his biological relatives, who are
all complete strangers to her, for his own selfish
reasons. 16
The court further concluded that even were there an adjudi-
cation of paternity, Tom's application for visitation would be
denied."'
On appeal, the appellate division reversed, in a three to
two decision with strong emotions in both the majority and
the dissent.' The majority grounded its ruling in the statute
that defines paternity by biology alone. Thus, Tom was enti-
tled to an order of filiation because he was Ry's biological fa-
ther. The majority rejected the trial court's application of es-
toppel principles, finding prior cases in which a biological
father was estopped from obtaining a paternity order irrele-
vant because in those cases the child was considered the "le-
gitimate" child of the mother and a different man. The major-
ity further distinguished the one case, Terrence M. v. Gale
C.,19 in which estoppel was applied to bar a paternity action
even though the child was not considered the "legitimate"
child of a marital union. It referred to Terrence M. as a case
in which an order of paternity would have "[shocked] the
child's sensibilities," and noted that there would be no such
shock in this case as Ry had known since she was three that
Tom was her biological father.2 °
Fundamentally, the appellate division saw a different
family from that seen by the trial court, the examining psy-
chiatrist, and the guardian ad litem. The trial court saw Tom
as ancillary to the central family unit of Robin, Sandra, Ry
and Cade; the appellate division saw Tom, Robin and Ry as a
family no different from that which exists when parents di-
vorce and the mother remarries. The appellate majority con-
sidered the trial court's decision a termination of Tom's pa-
rental rights and found that Robin was the one against whom
estoppel should be applied because she initiated and fostered
a relationship between Ry and Tom.
16. Id.
17. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377,382 (Fain. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
18. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
19. 597 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 1993).
20. Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
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The dissent criticized the majority's characterization of
the case as one concerning termination of parental rights,
considering it instead an action to establish parental rights
that did not otherwise exist. The dissent found no parental
rights flowing from biology alone in the absence of facts that
would justify the necessity of the biological father's consent in
an adoption proceeding concerning the child. Here, Tom had
neither sufficient contact with Ry, nor had he provided her
with sufficient financial support to confer the right to a pa-
rental relationship with Ry. 1
The dissent supported the use of equitable estoppel
against Tom, rejecting preservation of a child's legitimacy as
the sine qua non of equitable estoppel and finding instead
that serving the best interests of the child is the primary pur-
pose of the estoppel doctrine. Agreeing with the conclusions
of the trial court, the dissent found that
[w]hile the child has always known that petitioner is
her biological progenitor, it had consistently been demon-
strated by petitioner himself that this factor did not con-
fer upon him any authority or power over her life, that it
did not mean that Sandra R. was less her mother than
Robin Y., and that it did not mean that her sister was not
her full sister. To now grant him the standing to claim
the very considerable authority and power held by a par-
ent, against her wishes, would change her life in drastic
ways. For this reason, I believe that the elements of mis-
representation, reliance and detriment have clearly been
established and that the evidence demonstrated that an
order of filiation is not in this child's best interests. Under
these circumstances, the doctrine [of equitable estoppel]
should be applied. 22
The dissent recognized not only that a legitimate family
can consist of two mothers and two children, but that, within
a deliberate family structure, a child can know the man who
is her biological progenitor and comprehend the biological re-
ality without considering that man a parent.
The radically different visions of family identified by the
appellate division majority and dissent should not obscure
their common reasoning in one significant area. Both con-
curred that any agreement between Tom and Robin was un-
21. Id. at 365 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 367 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
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enforceable. The dissent characterized Tom's agreement to
forego initiating contact with Ry as "clearly not binding"23
and the majority called it "unenforceable for failure to comply
with explicit statutory requirements for surrender of paren-
tal rights."2 4 Thus no facet of Thomas S. supports the private
ordering of families without fathers.
B. Leckie v. Voorhies
An Oregon case, Leckie v. Voorhies,25 stands in contrast.
It is the only other reported appellate decision addressing a
paternity claim filed by a semen donor who originally agreed
to forego parental rights and subsequently developed a rela-
tionship with his biological child. The biological father was
unsuccessful in Leckie for the reason rejected by both the ma-
jority and the dissent in Thomas S.: his agreement to forego
parental rights. The Oregon court had no trouble holding
Leckie to his agreement, even though the facts he presented
demonstrated an arguably stronger relationship with the
child than that which Tom had with Ry.
Before conception, Michael Leckie ("Michael") entered
into a written agreement with Janet Voorhies ("Janet") and
her partner Margaret Sparrow ("Margaret") that he would
have "no paternal rights whatsoever" to any child conceived
with his semen.26 Each party waived any right to bring a pa-
ternity action, and the women agreed not to seek financial
responsibility toward the child from Michael. The women
agreed that Michael would have limited visitation rights at
their convenience, and they stated that they were happy to
have Michael in their lives "not as a father, but as a good
male role model" for their children.2 1
After Maya was born in July, 1988, Michael visited with
both her and with Janet's older son. When Maya was two
years old, Janet and the children moved to a house on
Michael's property close to Michael's house. For a year,
Michael saw the children between four and ten hours a week;
later he saw them less frequently. The court noted that
Michael made substantial financial contributions to Maya
23. Id. (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 361.
25. 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
26. Leckie, 875 P.2d at 521.
27. Id. at 521-22.
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and that both Maya and her brother sometimes referred to
Michael as "Dad" without Janet's objection.28
When Maya was three and a half years old, after conflict
between Janet and Michael over such matters as writing
thank you notes to Michael's mother and his drinking in front
of the children,29 and after several mediation sessions, the
parties again signed their original agreement with a specific
provision for six hours per month of visitation. Janet subse-
quently terminated all visitation, and Michael filed a pater-
nity action.
The trial court granted Janet's motion for summary judg-
ment and the appellate court affirmed. The court upheld
Michael's waiver of his entitlement to assert parental rights.
Michael tried to argue that the parties' conduct implicitly
modified their agreement, thereby vitiating the waiver. In
rejecting this argument, the court particularly noted that
there was no evidence of such conduct after the parties reaf-
firmed their agreement in December, 1991.30
The appellate court upheld Michael's waiver of parental
rights without citing any authority. In fact, Oregon has two
statutes that support private ordering. One reads that "[a]ny
authorization, release or waiver given by the putative father
with reference to the custody or adoption of the child or the
termination of parental rights shall be valid even if given
prior to the child's birth."31 Another reads that "[a]ny con-
tract between the mother and father of a child born out of
wedlock is a legal contract, and the admission by the father of
his fatherhood of the child is sufficient consideration to sup-
port the contract."32 Despite the obvious relevance of these
statutes, neither was cited by the court.
Because the court found a valid waiver of parental rights,
it did not address the question of whether it would be uncon-
stitutional as applied to Michael to bar his paternity action
under the Oregon statute that semen donors have no paren-
tal rights.3 The court also avoided any reference to policy
28. Id. at 522.
29. Memoranda from Mediation Sessions (on file with author).
30. Leckie, 875 P.2d at 522-23.
31. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.116 (1993).
32. Id. § 109.230.
33. In McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied,
784 P.2d 1100 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990), the Oregon appeals
court found that the state statute denying parental status to semen donors
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questions underlying enforceability of agreements involving
children. Further, there was no reference to the child's best
interests or to Michael as a potential source of financial sup-
port. The court further avoided any commentary on the fam-
ily configuration involved in the case.
Although the court did not issue a ruling grounded in the
child's best interests, those interests had been the subject of a
separate proceeding under a distinctive Oregon statute.
Michael had filed for visitation under an Oregon statute not
dependent upon biological parenthood.3 4 He had a full hear-
ing on this claim, and he was unsuccessful in obtaining visi-
tation. The trial court made a number of findings concerning
the family. These findings included the following:
Petitioner's [Michael's] relationship with the children
was similar to those the children had with several other
adults. There was no substantial difference in how the
children related to Petitioner, as opposed to other adults
familiar to the children, except that they had known him
longer and so perhaps were slightly more familiar ....
[Michael's] own description of his relationship does not
rise beyond that of a child care provider, even an excellent
child care provider. It is not essential for the best interest
of children to maintain contact with his or her biological
parent. It is not essential to the best interests of children
who have a strong attachment to a parent to maintain a
male role model, in that children receive gender identifi-
cation from many sources.3 5
would be unconstitutional if applied to a semen donor who had an agreement
with the recipient/mother that he would function as a father to the child. In
McIntyre, the parties disputed the existence of such an agreement, and the ap-
peals court sent the case back to the trial court for a hearing on the nature of
the agreement between the parties. In spite of his written agreement not to
seek parental rights, Leckie attempted to build a constitutional argument based
upon the McIntyre reasoning. Leckie, 875 P.2d at 522-23. The Leckie court ex-
plicitly declined to rule on this question. Id.
34. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(5) (1993). The statute provides that
a person who has maintained an ongoing personal relationship with
substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, com-
panionship, interplay and mutuality may petition the court ... for an
order providing for reasonable visitation rights. If the court deter-
mines from clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best
interests of the child and is otherwise appropriate in the case, the court
shall grant visitation to the person having the relationship described
in this subsection.
Id.
35. Leckie v. Voorhies, No. 60-92-06326 at 3-4 (Or., Lane County Cir. Ct.
Apr. 5, 1993) (order granting summary judgment).
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The court concluded that Michael had not shown that visita-
tion was in the best interests of the children.
3 6
The willingness of the trial court to make an individual-
ized determination not grounded in Michael's biological con-
nection to Maya is consistent with Oregon's overall statutory
scheme. Oregon statutes provide both that a semen donor
has no parental rights based upon biology alone,3 7 and that a
nonbiological parental figure has the opportunity to obtain
custody or visitation under specific circumstances. 38
Although the appellate court did not specifically so state, its
willingness to enforce Michael's contractual waiver and its
failure to base its decision on the method of conception may
have been influenced by its knowledge that Michael had his
day in court and that any biological father who waived his
rights as a parent would still receive a hearing under section
109.119(5).
This Oregon scheme is very close to the position advo-
cated by the American Civil Liberties Union in its amicus
brief in Thomas S. v. Robin Y. 39 The ACLU Brief uncoupled
biology and parental rights by formulating a means of both
enforcing parental rights for nonbiological "functional" par-
ents and waiving parental rights for biological parents. Spe-
cifically, it argued that an agreement to forego parental
rights should be enforceable to the extent that it deprives the
biological father of the ability to use his biological connection
to the child as a basis to obtain parental rights.40 A biological
father 41 who had relinquished entitlement to parental rights
but who met the definition of a "functional parent" could still
petition for rights based upon that status.
According to the ACLU definition, a functional parent
36. Id. at 4.
37. See OR. RE.v. STAT. § 109.239(1) (1993).
38. See id. § 109.119(5).
39. Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Thomas S. v. Robin
Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994) (No. P3884/91) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
40. Id. at 17.
41. The brief refers to semen donors, but its analytical framework is not
dependent upon method of conception. Id. Indeed, neither the majority nor the
dissent in Thomas S. based its analysis on the fact that Ry was conceived
through donor insemination. The majority relied on biology irrespective of
method of conception, and the dissent explicitly rejected differentiating on the
basis of method of conception, basing its ruling instead on "[petitioner's] failure
for almost 10 years to manifest a willingness to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood or to be a parent." Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 368
(App. Div. 1994).
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(1) will have spent considerable time with the child at
some point in the child's life, typically by living with the
child for some significant period(s) of time; (2) will have
for significant periods of time been responsible for and
called upon to make day-to-day decisions in the child's
existence; (3) will have played a significant role in the
broader decisions about a child's upbringing (such as
where the child would go to school, whether he or she
would be brought up in a particular religion, who would
provide medical care for the child, etc.); and (4) will have
come to play this de facto parental role with the consent of
the existing parent or parents who have legal custody of
the child. Additionally amicus curiae believes that the
view of the child as to whether the petitioner is regarded
as a parent figure and as to whether the child wishes to
continue the relationship, tempered by consideration of
the child's maturity, should be considered.42
This approach supports the enforceability of agreements
while providing the leeway to ensure ongoing contact be-
tween a child and a biological father if, in spite of an agree-
ment, the conduct of the parties supports application of the
functional parent criteria. Applying its test to the trial
court's findings in Thomas S., the ACLU argued that Tom
had not met the criteria for functional parenthood. The trial
court's findings in Leckie suggest that Michael could not have
met this standard either.
III. THE PREEMPTIvE STRIKE: VOLUNTARY COURT
TERMINATION OF A FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS
Thomas S. and Leckie exemplify court intervention upon
the breakdown of agreements between unmarried biological
parents. Thomas S. illustrates that such agreements may be
completely unenforceable. The validation of private ordering
epitomized in Leckie may be dependent upon Oregon's unique
statute providing a hearing to a functional parental figure
claiming a right to visitation with a child, and it may there-
fore be of little precedential value in other states. A series of
other paternity cases in planned lesbian families 43 supports
the urgency of developing a method of providing security to
42. ACLU Brief, supra note 39, at 26.
43. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); In re
R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
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the parenting arrangements initially created in such
families.
Every state provides some irrevocable mechanism for
both biological parents to relinquish their legal status. The
entire adoption system depends on the existence of such a
mechanism. Every state also provides some mechanism for a
parent to voluntarily relinquish parental rights when the
other parent's spouse is adopting the child. If the two biologi-
cal parents could use existing statutes to facilitate relin-
quishment by one parent, then the status of the family as one
without a legal father would be secure. States regularly per-
mit adoption of a child by a single parent who is not biologi-
cally related to the child. Logically, then, a procedure should
exist that results in a child having a single biologically re-
lated parent.
The dramatic range of state termination of parental
rights statutes does not support this logical result. One type
of statute makes this kind of private ordering impossible be-
cause termination is permitted only if filed by a state agency
or in contemplation of adoption. Another type of statute re-
quires cause or a high standard that cannot be met by con-
sent of the parents alone before termination can be granted.
Finally, when a statute on its face does not prohibit termina-
tion that will leave a child with one parent, courts have split
on whether such a result is permissible.
Arkansas exemplifies those states with statutes making
the private ordering I describe impossible. Arkansas statutes
provide for privately filed termination of parental rights only
in the context of an adoption proceeding.44 Otherwise, only
the State Department of Human Services may file a termina-
tion proceeding, and it may do so only when it is "attempting
to clear a juvenile for permanent placement" and when it has
physical or legal custody of the child.45
The Delaware statute forbids termination of only one
parent's rights, in the absence of a contemplated adoption,
"unless the Court shall find the continuation of the rights to
be terminated will be harmful to the child."46 Desired private
ordering is unlikely to meet this "harmful to the child"
standard.
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 1993).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 1993).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(b) (1993).
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When a statute does not prohibit a termination that will
leave a child with one parent, courts have split on whether
such a result is permissible. In In re A.B.,47 the trial court
granted a petition, agreed to by both parents, to terminate
the parental rights of the father.48  The parents were not
married. When the mother had become pregnant, the father
suggested marriage; she refused and he then suggested an
abortion. The petition was filed when the child was twenty-
one months old. The father had seen the child only two or
three times. The mother had thought that visits were not in
the child's best interests. The father said that the mother
was very capable, that he did not think the child should be
put between him and the mother, and that his own negative
experience living with his single mother with some involve-
ment from his father made him want to avoid this situation.
The trial court granted the termination to foreclose un-
certainty in the future. The judge found that this "uncer-
tainty about his role by continuing his legal status" would be
a hardship on the mother, but that it would also create a
hardship on the child as she got older and asked questions.
The appellate court reversed, holding that
[plarental rights may not be terminated merely to ad-
vance the parents' convenience and interests, either emo-
tional or financial.
This case is not one where termination would ad-
vance the prospects of a proposed adoption and a child's
resulting passage from instability to stability. While the
vicissitudes of life place many children in one-parent cir-
cumstances, it is generally better for children to have two
parents. Termination of the father's parental rights here
would cut an actual financial support line for his daughter
and would sever the potential for future emotional
succor.
4 9
In an earlier Wisconsin decision, the appellate court af-
firmed a trial court's denial of a joint petition to terminate the
father's parental rights.5 0 The child was thirteen and the
47. 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App.), rev'g No. 88-1494 (Wis. App. June 8,
1989).
48. In re A.B., No. 88-1494 (Wis. App. June 8, 1989); see also Trial Record
Transcript, In re A.B., No. 88-1494 (Wis. App. June 8, 1989) (on file with
author).
49. In re A.B., 444 N.W.2d 415,419 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).
50. In re D.P.C., 375 N.W.2d 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
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parents had divorced when the child was under two. The
mother wanted the termination because she wanted to be
sure that if she died the father would not be able to obtain
custody. The trial court found this, and the father's "inatten-
tion," insufficient reasons to terminate his parental rights in
the absence of an available "substitute parent," citing the sev-
erance of inheritance rights from the father and his parents.
The affirmance stated that no evidence has been offered that
the child will benefit from the termination.
By contrast, a California court interpreted its statutes to
permit a termination of one parent's rights in the absence of
an expected adoption.5 1 The parents had separated before
the child was born and the father had never seen his son.
The mother received public assistance, and the state had filed
against the father for reimbursement. The mother, with the
father's consent, filed to terminate the father's parental
rights on the grounds of abandonment. The trial court found
factual support for the allegations, but denied the petition,
stating that a child's best interests are served by having two
parents. The trial court said that the father need not take an
active role in the child's life if he did not believe that it was in
the child's best interests, but that "terminating the parental
rights of one parent under circumstances that result in the
minor child having only one legal parent is contrary to public
policy."52
The appellate court reversed. It found that facilitating
an imminent adoption was not required and stated that
[it] fail[s] to understand the rationale for finding it would
be contrary to public policy to place a child in a situation
where he or she would have only one legal parent. Indeed,
single parent adoptions are routinely permitted .... It
would be ludicrous to conclude that a parent who is inef-
fectual, unfit and unsuitable is better than no parent at
all.53
There was a strong dissent based upon the loss of finan-
cial support. The dissent answered the majority's notation
concerning single-parent adoptions by saying that such adop-
tions are
51. In re Joshua M., 274 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Ct. App. 1990).
52. Id. at 224.
53. Id. at 225 (Wallin, J., dissenting).
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favored because a child with no parents at least gains one
loving, nurturing parent. This has nothing whatever to
do with the majority's decision that Joshua, who already
has his mother as a parent but who apparently lives in
straitened economic circumstances, should be deprived
forever of the financial support of his father.54
Ignoring the benefits of a secure one-parent home, and
echoing the private responsibility for supporting children in a
culture that consistently refuses to make such support a mat-
ter of public priority, the dissent stated that
[aillowing the custodial parent to obtain an order
which has as its only practical effect the termination of
the noncustodial parent's financial obligations opens new
frontiers for negotiation in family law cases. Many non-
custodial parents will be eager to make other concessions
in return for the custodial parent's cooperation in ob-
taining their release from the financial obligations of child
support. But the children who need that financial sup-
port, and the taxpayers who frequently will have to pro-
vide it, will be the ultimate losers. 55
IV. CONCLUSION
In gay and lesbian families, terminating a biological par-
ent's parental rights is the complement to obtaining a second-
parent adoption for a nonbiological parent. Second-parent
adoption solidifies the parental status of the nonbiological
parent who would otherwise be a legal stranger to the child,
regardless of the intent and conduct of the parties.5 6 Termi-
54. Id. at 226 (Wallin, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 225-26 (Wallin, J., dissenting).
56. Such adoptions are uniformly permitted in Massachusetts, Vermont
and the District of Columbia, and are not permitted in Wisconsin. Compare In
re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993), In re Adoptions of
B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) and In re M.M.D. and B.H.M.,
20 Fain. L. Rep. 1307 (D.C. Super. Ct. No. A-62-93, May 25, 1994) with In re
Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). One Illinois appellate court has
approved such adoptions, In re KM. and D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995), and the appellate courts of New York have divided on the question,
which will be settled by the decision in In re Dana, 624 N.Y.S.2d 634 (App. Div.
1995), argued before the New York Court of Appeals in June, 1995. Such adop-
tions have been granted by trial courts in Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Califor-
nia, Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey, Colorado, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. See
generally Committee on Sex and Law, Second-Parent Adoption in New York
State: Furthering the Best Interests of Our Children, 47 REC. Ass'N BAR CrrY
N.Y. 83 (1992); Carole S. Cullum, Co-Parent Adoptions: Lesbian and Gay
Parenting, 29 TRLAL 28 (1993); Emily C. Pratt, Second Parent Adoption: When
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nation of parental rights solidifies the absence of parental
status of a biological progenitor who would otherwise have
the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, regardless of
the intent and conduct of the parties. Both options are criti-
cal to the creation and preservation of secure families in
which children can be assured that the reality of their family
structure will not be destroyed by subsequent imposition of
definitions of parenthood that do not comport with their
experience.
It would be ironic, however, if the current restrictions on
termination of a biological father's parental rights were loos-
ened only to the extent that such termination could occur
when the biological mother's partner was ready to adopt the
child in a second-parent adoption, but not when the mother,
either lesbian or heterosexual, was single. When the two bio-
logical parents agree that a child will be raised in a stable
family structure without a legal father, implementation of
that agreement through a termination of parental rights pro-
ceeding should be available. In states without explicit statu-
tory restrictions on application of the statute to such a pro-
ceeding, courts should adopt the approach of the Joshua M.
majority.
Statutory and doctrinal impediments to legal validation
of families without fathers constitute more than a rejection of
private family ordering. State control of the definition of
parenthood, as long as it demands that every child have a
legal father, furthers both the explicit and implicit rhetoric of
the fathers' rights movement that a father belongs at the
head of every household as the ultimate authority figure.57
Professor Martha Fineman observes that "[t]he success of
Crossing the Marital Barrier Is in a Child's Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 96 (1987-1988) (citing trial court orders in various states); Carrie Bashaw,
Comment, Protecting Children in Nontraditional Families: Second Parent
Adoptions in Washington, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 321 (1990); Note, Joint
Adoption: A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REV. 197 (1990); Elizabeth Zuckermann,
Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Rec-
ognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 729 (1986). See also Marie
Beunaiche, EQUAL TIMES, May 10, 1991, at 1 (reporting first second-parent
adoption in Minnesota); Judge Lets Lesbian Adopt Her Partner's Daughter,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 8, 1993, at A13 (reporting first second-parent adoption
in Texas).
57. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
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single mothers would be a blow to traditional masculinity." s5
Legal validation of single mothers would be an even greater
blow.
The imperative to find a legal father for every child pro-
vides a convenient smokescreen, a diversion of energy and re-
sources from the possible solutions to children's real
problems. Targeting single motherhood, therefore, serves the
dual purpose of perpetuating patriarchal ideology and exon-
erating the state from its obligation to provide children with
at least minimally adequate financial well-being, health care,
education and physical safety. The court decisions in Leckie
and in In re Joshua M. thus do more than legitimate families
without fathers. By validating such families, the decisions
implicitly demand that society look elsewhere for a solution
to the real problems facing today's children.
58. Id. at 205.
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